The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice by Marcus, Richard L.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
1998
The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice
Richard L. Marcus
UC Hastings College of the Law, marcusr@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1749 (1998).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/459
Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Author: Richard L. Marcus
Title: The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice
Source: Texas Law Review
Citation: 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1749 (1998).
Originally published in the TEXAS LAW REVIEW. The English version is reprinted with 
permission from the TEXAS LAW REVIEW and the University of Texas, Austin, School of Law.
Marcus Richard
The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice
Richard L. Marcus*
The draftsmen of the Civil Rules proceeded on the
conviction, based on experience at common law and under the
codes, that pleadings are not of great importance in a lawsuit.
The keystone of the system of procedure embodied in the
rules is Rule 8 .... The other procedural devices of the
rules-broad joinder, discovery, free amendment, and summary
judgment-rest on these provisions about pleadings.'
Charles Alan Wright
It is clear that Professor Wright was correct about the tenor and
content of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding pleading. The
drafter of those rules-Charles Clark, who was Professor Wright's
mentor-initially favored abolishing pleading motions altogether under the
new national procedures so that all merits dispositions would have to be by
summary judgment.' Although the drafters declined such a radical course,
they clearly intended to curtail reliance on the pleadings and minimize
pleading practice. Therefore, Rule 8 only requires that the complaint set
forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief."3 Pleading decisions, so prominent at common law and
under the codes, were to wither and die except in extraordinary
circumstances.4
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I am
indebted to Car Pinkowski, Hastings class of 1999, for research assistance on this essay. I am also
indebted to the participants at the Symposium on October 31 and November 1, 1997 for a number of
very helpful comments that I have appropriated for inclusion in this essay. All errors that remain are
mine alone. Copyright 1998 by Richard L. Marcus.
1. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 66, at 456, § 68, at 467-68 (5th ed.
1994).
2. See Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85
YALE L.J. 914, 927-28 (1976).
3. FED. R. CiV. P. 8(a)(2).
4. See WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 68, at 471 (stating that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is allowed
only in "the extraordinary case where the pleader makes allegations that show on the face of the
complaint some insuperable bar to relief").
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At first, there was resistance from some quarters, and proposals were
made for rewriting the rules to require more of the pleadings But in
1957 the Supreme Court announced in Conley v. Gibson6 that "a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief."7 Although somewhat hyperbolic,' this deci-
sion was apparently intended to put the matter of deciding cases on the
pleadings to rest, and proposals to tighten the pleading rules ceased.9
But pleading practice persisted. In some areas-notably securities
fraud litigation and civil rights suits-the courts appeared to disinter fact
pleading, which flourished under the codes and had been thought buried.
A dozen years ago, I examined this trend in the reported cases l0 and con-
cluded that, even though it seemed a well-intended judicial response to
5. In 1952, for example, a recommendation issued from the Ninth Circuit judicial conference that
Rule 8(a)(2) be amended to direct that the plaintiff allege "the facts constituting a cause of action."
See Judicial Conference of the Judges of the Ninth Circuit, Claim or Cause ofAction: A Discussion of
the Need for Amendment to Rule 8(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253
(1952). Also during the 1940s and 1950s, some district judges in New York undertook to upgrade
pleading requirements in antitrust cases. See Archie 0. Dawson, The Place of the Pleadings in a
ProperDefinition of the Issues in the "Big Case," in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON PROTRACTED
CASES, reprinted in 23 F.R.D. 430, 433-35 (1958). Meanwhile, Professor McCaskill lobbied academ-
ically for a return to the old ways. See O.L. McCaskill, The Modem Philosophy of Pleading: A
Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A. J. 123 (1958).
6. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
7. Id. at 45-46. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Hazard says that Conley "turned
Rule 8 on its head." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Kept, 76 TEXAS L. REV.
1665, 1685 (1998).
8. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.6, at 148 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that
to some extent Conley v. Gibson's language was hyperbole).
9. Even when invited to recommend changes to the pleading rules, critics of civil litigation
declined. For example, in 1977 President Carter established a National Commission for the Review
of the Antitrust Laws and Procedures in reaction to criticism of antitrust litigation. He directed that
the Commission consider, among other things, "revision of pleading requirements in order to narrow
as quickly and precisely as possible the scope of contested issues of fact and law." Exec. Order No.
12,022 § 2(a)(1)(ii), 3 C.F.R. 154 (1978). The Commission made recommendations in a wide variety
of areas-narrowing the scope of discovery, using time limits for pretrial activities, increasing sanctions
for misbehavior in litigation, increasing judicial involvement to focus the issues in the case, and
expanding use of summary judgment. But it did not propose changes to pleading requirements. See
NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, reprinted in 80 F.R.D. 509, 515-20 (1979). But the staff
of the Commission reported that "[tihere has been little testimony or comment presented to the
Commission favoring increased specificity in antitrust pleadings." National Comm'n for the Review
of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, The Early Narrowing and Resolution of Issues, 48 ANTTusr L.J.
1041, 1056 (1980).
10. Whether the tenor of reported pleading cases accurately reflected the overall handling of such
problems in civil litigation remains uncertain. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, USE OF RULE 12(B)(6) IN
TWO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 12 (1989) (examining "the Marcus thesis," which proposed that the
number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions had increased, by studying the frequency of motions in terminated
cases in two districts between 1975 and 1988 and finding that the frequency of such motions in civil
cases in general had decreased).
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stresses of modem litigation, it often presented problems." Although
achieving merits decisions appeared a legitimate objective for pleadings
motions, those motions produced reliable decisions only when more specif-
icity was likely to disclose a fatal defect in the plaintiff's case or when the
complaint contained sufficient detail to enable the court to make a reliable
determination that the defendant did not violate the plaintiff's rights. 2
Unfortunately, however, many courts were using pleading scrutiny to probe
the evidentiary basis for the plaintiffs' factual conclusions; for this purpose
pleadings motions decisions appeared unable to provide a reliable basis for
decisions. 3 Summary judgment, though widely considered disfavored at
that time, offered a seemingly preferable alternative, provided that discov-
ery was controlled. 4
In the dozen years since, a number of developments have occurred that
bear on the role of pleading practice: (1) In 1986, the Supreme Court
endorsed more vigorous use of summary judgment, bringing it out from
under the cloud under which it labored; 5 (2) In 1993, the Court disap-
proved heightened pleading requirements in some civil rights cases and
appeared to re-embrace Conley v. Gibson in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit;6 (3) The Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules has considered amending the pleading rules
(which have remained essentially untouched until now) in rather
contradictory ways: either abolishing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim,'7 or fortifying pleading requirements and
motion practice in the wake of the Supreme Court's Leatherman
decision; 8 and (4) In 1995, Congress adopted the Private Securities
11. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 434 (1986). For other commentary reporting a similar phenome-
non at the same time, see David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65
CoRNELL L. REV. 390 (1980); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints:
A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677, 679-82 (1984).
12. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 459-65.
13. See id. at 466-71.
14. See id. at 484-91.
15. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Summary judgment procedure is
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal
Rules as a whole. .... -).
16. 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). This case is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 93-114.
17. For this proposal, which was made by Paul Carrington, Reporter of the Committee, see
WILLGING, supra note 10, at 1 n. 1. In fairness, it is important to appreciate that one aspect of this pro-
posal was to supplant summary judgment, directed verdict, and JNOV practice with a single motion
for "judgment as a matter of law," in addition to abolishing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Eventually, only
the change in name for Rule 50 motions was adopted. For an examination of the issues, see Paul D.
Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of
Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2105-07,2109-12 (1989).
18. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules 17-18 (May 3-5, 1993) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (discussing the possibility of
1998] 1751
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Litigation Reform Act, 9 which prescribes stringent pleading requirements
for securities fraud cases.
Thus, not only has there been serious discussion about changing the
pleading rules for the first time in forty years, but there have also been
significant changes regarding pleading in two areas where pleading practice
had emerged as important since Conley v. Gibson-civil rights and securi-
ties fraud suits. Prodded by these developments, this essay reflects in a
non-exhaustive way' ° on the implications of these developments for the
rules and for pleading practice. It begins by sketching the traditional
pleading practice background and the Federal Rules' modification of that
experience. Against that background, it explores the considerable latitude
for pleading practice built into the rules already and the likely implications
of recent changes in civil rights and securities fraud litigation for the rules.
It concludes that these developments have not to date provided a reason for
changing the rules from the model adopted in the 1930s.
I. The Federal Rules' Break with the Past
Had there never been pleading practice in the Anglo-American style,
it is not clear that one would have to invent it; some refined legal systems
forgo any such activities."' Even in England, pleading began as a more
relaxed affair involving oral exchanges before the judge.' But those
heightened pleading requirements for certain types of cases); Judicial Conference of the United States,
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Draft on Particularized Pleading (Sept. 17, 1993) (on file with
the Texas Law Review) (suggesting a variety of possible amendments to Rules 8 and 9 to magnify their
requirements); Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules 5-8 (Oct. 21-23, 1993) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (continuing the discussion of possible
amendments to restore heightened pleading requirements); Judicial Conference of the United States,
Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 17-18 (Apr. 20, 1995) (on file with the Texas Law
Review) (discussing such possible changes but concluding that present action is not warranted).
19. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. §§ 77-88 (Supp. II 1996)). For a discussion of the pleading provisions of this Act, see infra
notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
20. A comprehensive examination of the multitude of cases involving these issues is beyond the
scope of this paper.
21. See JAMES, supra note 8, § 3.2, at 140 ("The process of identifying and resolving the issues
in controversy can be conducted largely by oral exchange . . . ."); Benjamin Kaplan, Civil
Procedure-Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REv. 409, 410 (1960) (reporting
that in German procedure the main focus is on conferences between counsel and the judge and that "no
question arises as to the sufficiency of the pleadings as such, nor is there any motion practice directed
to the pleadings themselves").
22. Two commentators described the process:
We may occasionally find long debates between the parties. Not only are they long, but,
if judged by the standard of a later time, they are loose and irregular. The pleaders must
be charged with many faults which would have shocked their successors; they habitually
"plead evidence," they are guilty of argumentativeness and duplicity.
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 615 (2d ed. 1923);
see also ROBERT W. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1752
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simple early days lie in the very distant past. Perhaps because of the need
for a single question for the jury,' written pleadings were introduced.
These written pleadings became increasingly intricate and ornate in
their pursuit of a single issue to present before a jury. Pleading lay at the
heart of litigation to a degree difficult for one in the late twentieth century
to grasp, for no other litigation activity rivaled it in importance. But
because pleading practice was littered with arcana, by the early nineteenth
century it seemed often to produce decisions entirely unrelated to the
merits. As a consequence, pleading was held up to public ridicule.24 In
both England and the United States, mid-nineteenth century reform move-
ments sought to bury this history by confining the pleading requirements
to the basic facts of the case and abolishing the multilayered pleading
extravaganza that had typified common law procedure.' In this country,
the Field Code provided the principal vehicle for this change.'
Whether or not the English reform effort achieved its objectives, by
the first third of this century it was widely believed that the American one
had fallen short.' The chief difficulty seemed to result from terminology
and habit. The Field Code's directive that the plaintiff include the facts on
which the suit was based' afforded myriad opportunities to debate what
was a "fact," for the pleading was insufficient if limited to conclusions and
was improper if packed with evidence. This debate appealed to judges
trained in the old ways, and pleading decisions continued to multiply.
The Federal Rules broke with this past, and Rule 8 was the principal
vehicle because it made no reference to "facts" and did not call for stating
a "cause of action." As Judge Wald says in her contribution to this
Symposium, Rule 8 was the "jewel in the crown of the Federal Rules.'29
6 (1952) ("The introduction of written pleadings served to install a measure of rigidity wholly absent
from the previous practice of oral altercation.").
23. "[Ihe development of the jury system in England led to a substitution of formal written
demands and answers in place of the earlier simple oral statements of counsel in response to the ques-
tions of the court, as we find them in the early Year Book cases." Charles E. Clark, Simplified
Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458 (1942).
24. See Kevin M. Teeven, A History of the Legislative Reform of the Common Law of Contract,
26 U. TOL. L. REv. 35, 66 (1995) (recounting the injustices resulting from the strict pleading require-
ments of the Hilary Rules in England, and the subsequent movement for sweeping reform of special
pleading in favor of fact pleading).
25. See, e.g., CHARLEs M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN
AMERICA AND ENGLAND 67-83 (Cincinnati, W.H. Anderson & Co. 1897).
26. See id. at 87-172 (delineating the impact of the Field Code on the American metamorphosis
away from formalistic pleading).
27. See MILLAR, supra note 22, at 187-95.
28. As originally adopted, the Field Code required the pleader to provide "[a] statement of the
facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such
a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended." See Marcus,
supra note 11, at 438.
29. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEXAs L. REv. 1897, 1917 (1998).
1998] 1753
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Although abolishing pleading motions altogether might have been a fuller
break, a profound culture change has surely occurred even without that
final step. Far from enthusing about pleading decisions, courts routinely
denounce this means of ending litigation.30  But that does not mean that
the Rules abolished pleading practice.
II. The Role of Pleading Practice Under the Federal Rules
Perhaps it would be a good thing were somebody to calculate the
likely fate of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals on appeal. In 1984, Judge
Schwarzer provided analogous figures concerning review of district court
orders granting summary judgment,31 thereby somewhat defusing the
widespread belief that granting summary judgment invited reversal. The
Supreme Court's endorsement of summary judgment two years later, citing
Judge Schwarzer's article,32 confirmed his conclusion that summary judg-
ments can survive. After Conley v. Gibson, dismissing a case on the
pleadings seemed an even greater provocation to a court of appeals than
granting summary judgment. As Professor Wright himself has pointed out,
shortly after that decision an empirical study showed that pleading motions
led to final termination in only about 2% of all cases,33 and more recent
work by the Federal Judicial Center suggests figures in the 3 % to 6%
rangeY3
Certainly these percentages do not approach the frequency of pleadings
dispositions under the common law or even code pleading regimes, which
is proof of the culture change that has occurred. That does not mean that
pleadings decisions are unimportant under the Rules, however. Small
though these figures seem, they should be compared to the rate of trial in
civil cases, which is not much higher.35  Rule 12(b)(6) motions thus
30. See, e.g., Lowery v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242,247 (5th Cir. 1997) ("A motion
to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) 'is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.'" (quoting Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982))).
31. See William W Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine
Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 467 & n.9 (1984) (finding that summary judgments are
reversed less frequently than most judgments in the Ninth Circuit).
32. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Given the tenor of the Supreme
Court's decision, it is perhaps ironic that the district court's grant of summary judgment in this case
was held improper on remand. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
33. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 66 at 462 (describing the results from a 1962 sampling).
34. See WILLGING, supra note 10, at 5-8 (describing a 1975 study showing a 6% dismissal rate
and a 1988 study showing a 3% rate). Judge Wald's article in this Symposium cited considerably
higher figures for the District of Columbia District Court, see Wald, supra note 29, at 1915 & n.1 11,
but it is not clear how many of these are for dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).
35. For such a comparison, see Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the
Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162-64 (1986) (reporting, based on a study of several district courts and
state courts, that there was a 7% trial rate as opposed to a 15% termination rate through some other
form of adjudication, and a 9% settlement rate following a ruling on a significant motion).
1754 [Vol. 76:1749
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afford litigants a disposition on the merits approximately as frequently as
trials. Because access to a judicial decision is an important value, these
figures suggest that pleadings decisions still play an important role, albeit
lacking the central importance of the past. Pleadings motions are not so
moribund as might be expected.
Pleadings motions have persisted in part because the rules themselves
authorize them and to some extent foster them. Rule 8(a)(2) is the center-
piece in downplaying pleadings, but it does say that the "short and plain
statement of the claim" should be one "showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief," something the Supreme Court conveniently overlooked in Conley
v. Gibson.36 And the rules do not stop there. They also prescribe con-
ciseness and directness in pleadings37 and instruct that there should be
separate paragraphs for each assertion.38 If exhibits are attached to a
pleading, they become a part of the pleading for all purposes, including the
decision of a motion to dismiss.39 Rule 9 adds heightened pleading
requirements for certain matters. These prescriptions contain teeth, too.
Contrary to Clark's original preferences, the rules include a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.' They also authorize a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, 4' a motion for a more definite statement,42
and a motion to strike.43 Added to this array, perhaps, is the reply
authorized by Rule 7.4 Even when the problem is one of form rather
than substance, a court can dismiss if the plaintiff refuses to plead
properly. 45
These provisions are not self-actualizing, however, and their operation
depends largely on the purposes for including them in the rules.
Essentially, there appear to be three. First, the pleading motions may
serve to assure the defendant of notice of the basis for the suit. The
criteria for the motion for a more definite statement' are keyed precisely
36. See infra text accompanying notes 111-13.
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 10(b); see also infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text (describing the
consideration of materials submitted by defendants even though not attached as exhibits by plaintiffs).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c).
40. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
43. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(0.
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a). See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRGTrr & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1185, at 20-24 (2d ed. 1990). A description of a novel use
of Rule 7 occurs infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
45. For example, in McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff persisted in
loading up the complaint with irrelevancies "designed to provide quotations for newspaper stories,"
despite the district court's order that the complaint be refined. Id. at 1178. The district court dismis-
sed with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(b), id. at 1177, and the court of appeals affirmed, id. at 1180.
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) ("If a pleading.., is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.., the party may move for a more definite
statement. .. ").
17551998]
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to this objective, which also corresponds to the notice pleading rhetoric of
Conley v. Gibson.4' But as a goal for pleadings requirements or pleadings
motions, this goal still seems insufficient.' Even with the 1993 fortifica-
tion of Rule 11 regarding denials,4 9 it is hard to believe that defendants
will find it difficult to deny plaintiff's allegations because the complaint is
vague, and defendant's ability to assert affirmative defenses turns little on
the clarity of the complaint.
Second, pleadings set the parameters for the ensuing litigation of the
case. The scope of discovery and relevance rulings at trial depend on what
the pleadings place in issue. But the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
require that a matter be in dispute for evidence on that topic to be
admissible.' More significantly, increased judicial management means
that pretrial orders often supersede the pleadings,5 and the liberality of
amendment also shows that setting outside limitations for the scope of
litigation is not an important objective for pleading practice.
What pleading actually does, then, is to serve the third purpose-
disposition on the merits. Although possible in only a small percentage of
cases, 5 merits disposition provides a principal reason for retaining
pleading motions in the scheme of the rules. And it should not be thought
that pleading motions further this goal only when they lead to a complete
dismissal. A motion to dismiss that whittles a complaint with twenty
claims down to two viable claims has not been a failure in terms of merits
dispositions.53 Neither is a motion that strikes a legally unjustified prayer
for huge punitive damages or a legally unwarranted affirmative defense.
None of these would show up as final disposition by pleading practice, but
none should be dismissed as "another instance of judicial haste which in the
long run makes waste. "'
The courts appear to have grasped this point despite their rhetoric
about limiting pleading practice to providing notice of the general basis for
the claim. Indeed, one innovation in the rules that recognizes this
47. See infra text accompanying note 111.
48. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 451-54 (asserting that the notice pleading argument turns into
a chimera under analysis).
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(b)(4) (providing that, by denying an allegation, a defense counsel cer-
tifies that the denial either is based on evidence or reasonably based on lack of information or belief).
50. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note ("The fact to which the evidence is directed
need not be in dispute.").
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e) (directing that pretrial orders "shall control the subsequent course
of the action").
52. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (describing data on the percentage of cases
finally resolved on a motion to dismiss).
53. See Kritzer, supra note 35, at 163-64 (describing the percentage of cases settled after ruling
in pretrial motions).
54. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944). Judge Charles Clark authored this
famous phrase.
1756 [Vol. 76:1749
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pragmatic orientation was designed to expand opportunities for pleadings
dispositions. The common law and code pleading approaches outlawed the
"speaking demurrer."55 But as Rule 10(c)'s provision for consideration
of exhibits shows, and as the final sentence of Rule 12(b) suggests 5 6
under the Federal Rules courts can go beyond the pleader's allegations in
pursuit of merits decisions at the pleading stage. Courts have energetically
seized this opportunity and permitted defendants to bring a range of materi-
als to bear on the complaint in support of motions to dismiss, even where
not attached as exhibits.'
At first blush, the whole idea of deciding pleadings motions on the
basis of extraneous materials rather than the allegations of the complaint
not only deviates from the prior practice but startles legal sensibilities.
Surely the plaintiff in a defamation case does not, by attaching the alleg-
edly defamatory letter to the complaint, admit the truth of the statements
in the letter. 8 Similarly, attachment of erroneous documents as exhibits
should not irrevocably bind the pleader to accept their contents 9.5  These
obvious points underscore the evaluative nature of this review of
exhibits: °
55. A "speaking demurrer" is one that "alleges affirmative matter which, taken with the allegations
in the complaint, shows that no cause of action is stated." 2 JAMEs M. KERR, KERR'S PLEADING AND
PRACTICE IN THE WESTERN STATES § 874, at 1245-46 (1919). See, e.g., id. ("A demurrer must be
directed at the complaint only."); ROGER O'DONNELL, PROCEDURE AND FORMS: COMMON LAW
PLEADING 197 (1934) (arguing that the speaking demurrer "is a prostitution of the objects and purposes
of a demurrer").
56. The text of the final sentence of Rule 12(b) is reproduced infra note 61.
57. See, e.g., CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1508-09 &
n.5 (1st Cir. 1996) (allowing evidence of unattached informational brochures); Goodwin v. Elkins &
Co., 730 F.2d 99, 113 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., concurring) (arguing that the district court's
consideration of an unattached partnership agreement was proper because "the allegations of [the]
complaint [were] based on [the] underlying written documents, and the authenticity of those documents
was unchallenged"); Greene v. Term City, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 584, 586 n.l (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding
an EEOC charge to be part of the pleadings, even though it was not attached to the complaint). But
see Cipollone v. University of Pa., No. CIV.A.97-6565, 1998 WL 47285, at *1 n.l (E.D. Pa. Feb.
3, 1998) (limiting Rule 12(b)(6) review to the "complaint, pertinent matters of public record, orders,
items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to the complaint"); Dalissio v. DePuy,
Inc., No. CIV.A.96-5295, 1998 WL 24330, at *4 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998) (prohibiting court
review of unattached depositions as part of its consideration of a motion to dismiss).
58. See Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the district court erred in dis-
missing a defamation action on the basis that statements made by the defendant in a letter attached as
an exhibit to the complaintwere not defamatory as a matter of law because they were merely statements
of opinion).
59. See Banco Del Estado v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 942 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (ruling that the attachment of exhibits that contained erroneous translations did not constitute a
binding judicial admission that they were correct where the original, untranslated document was also
attached to the complaint).
60. Professor Wright's treatise explains:
The court is not bound to accept the pleader's allegations as to the effect of the exhibit,
but can independently examine the docurnent and form its own conclusions as to the
proper construction and meaning to be given the material. When a disparity exists
HeinOnline -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  1757 1997-1998
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More notable for our purposes, however, is the willingness of courts
to consider materials not attached to the complaint while ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Even though such consideration seems to contravene the
final sentence of Rule 12(b), 61 and even though it is agreed that the plain-
tiff is not required to attach exhibits to the complaint,62 numerous deci-
sions reject plaintiff's claims on the basis of such materials because
defendants have attached them to a motion to dismiss. Different formula-
tions exist for explaining when this activity is warranted. Generally, courts
look to whether the materials are referred to in plaintiff's complaint,63
whether they are "central" to the claim,' and whether any legitimate
ground exists for disputing their authenticity.65 In addition to publicly-
filed documents, which may be particularly suitable for consideration,'
courts may also refer to facts susceptible to judicial notice.67 Careful
examination of this body of precedent would be a worthwhile inquiry, but
is beyond the scope of this essay. The basic point is to recognize why
between the written instrument annexed to the pleadings and the allegations in the
pleadings, the written instrument will control.
5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 44, § 1327, at 766-67 (footnotes omitted).
61. The sentence provides:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
62. "[Tlhere is no requirement that the pleader attach a copy of the writing on which his action
or defense is based." 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 44, § 1327, at 762.
63. See GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997)
(relying on a document referred to in the complaint and central to the claim); Fecht v. Price Co., 70
F.3d 1078, 1080 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that it was proper to consider a document whose contents
were alleged in the complaint that is not challenged on authenticity grounds).
64. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding
that a court may refer to a defendant's annual report because the claims were based on it even though
it was not cited in the complaint); Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (allowing
the consideration of plan documents in an ERISA action because the plaintiff's claims were based on
them); Venture Assocs. v. Zenith Data Sys., 987 F.2d 429, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1993) (characterizing
documents as "central" to the plaintiff's claims and representing "the core of the parties' contractual
relationship").
65. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that "courts have made
narrow exceptions for documents the authenticity of which [is] not disputed by the parties"). Compare
with Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the alleged transcripts of tele-
phone conference calls that were referred to in the complaint should not be considered because plaintiffs
denied their authenticity).
66. See In re STAC Electronics Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
the suitability of a prospectus used in connection with a stock offering for consideration by the court);
Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1996) (allowing the consideration
of documents filed with the SEC, but only to determine the content of the documents, not the truth of
statements contained therein).
67. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 44, § 1363, at 464-65.
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courts have taken this step-to decide cases on the merits when that can be
done accurately at the pleading stage.
Another symptom of the courts' focus on merits disposition can be
found in the motion for a more definite statement. As suggested above,'
this motion seems a pointless exercise for its stated purpose. But as a
means for ferreting out a fatal fact in the plaintiff's claim, it can foster
merits decisions. Thus, despite statements that such motions should not be
used to "flesh out" the complaint and pave the way for a motion to
dismiss,69 the current edition of Professor Wright's multivolume treatise
recognizes that the prospect of a dismissal presents a legitimate reason for
granting a motion for a more definite statement,' and there is at least
some indication that courts will entertain a motion for a more definite state-
ment as a prelude to dismissal."
The problem, then, is to determine when pleading practice serves to
further the goal of merits pleading dispositions. The proper focus remains
where it was a dozen years ago-on cases in which a fatal fact defeats
plaintiff's claim or the court can reliably determine from the pleadings that
the claim has no merit.' Yet, just as was true a dozen years ago, courts
appear to stretch when they fear litigation otherwise may be abused.
A prime example is the Second Circuit's handling of securities fraud
suits. In a 1979 decision, Ross v. A.H. Robins Co.,' the court decried
the risk that such cases would afford an "in terrorem increment" to
68. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
69. United States v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 73 F.R.D. 460, 462 & n.2 (D. Del. 1977).
70. The Treatise observes that:
[S]ome cases state that it always is improper to use a Rule 12(e) motion to obtain
admissions from the claimant in the hope of clearing the way for a later Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Although judicial statements of this type arguably are consistent with
the wording of Rule 12(e), they probably go too far in limiting the availability of the
motion. The courts need not completely refrain from using Rule 12(e) as an aid in
achieving the summary adjudication of certain cases; it merely is necessary to act with
caution to keep its use within proper bounds.
Consequently, there should be a bias against use of the Rule 12(e) motion as a
precursor to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or as a method for seeking out a threshold defense
.... A request for a more definite statement for either of those purposes should not be
granted unless the movant shows that there actually is a substantial threshold question that
may be dispositive.
5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 44, § 1376, at 597-98.
71. For example, in Fleming v. AT&T Information Services, Inc., 878 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir.
1989), the defendant moved to dismiss because the plaintiff's complaint failed to rebut the presumption
of at-will employment. Id. at 1473. The district court treated that motion as a motion for a more def-
inite statement, which it granted. After the plaintiff complied, the court granted a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1473; accord Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 792 (11th Cir.
1988) (approving as proper the district court's treatment of a motion to dismiss as a motion for a more
definite statement).
72. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 459-65.
73. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979).
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settlements in groundless cases.' Accordingly, it insisted that the
plaintiffs "specifically plead those events which they assert give rise to a
strong inference that the defendants had knowledge of the facts" plaintiffs
claimed were wrongfully omitted from public statements. 5 In part, this
insistence was rooted in the heightened pleading requirements for fraud
cases contained in Rule 9(b), but the second sentence of that rule76
precludes requiring specifics about the state of mind or knowledge of the
defendant. Not only did it contradict the rule, the Second Circuit's
approach also thrust upon the courts the difficult problem of defining a
"strong inference" of scienter. 7
More recently, distinguished courts have gone further afield. A lead-
ing example is Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner,7 a 1990 CERCLA case in
which Judge Robert Keeton attempted to cobble together authority for
demanding pleading requirements to combat a perceived risk of abuse of
the litigation process.79  The judge, surely a towering figure," was at
the time of this decision the Chair of the Judicial Conference's Standing
Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure. But even his efforts
to find authority in the rules fell short."' The suit sought to recover
cleanup costs that were allegedly caused by corporate defendants who had
used chemical solvents on sites adjacent to the land in question s The
judge found plaintiffs' claims against the corporations sufficient, but balked
at their addition of claims against several officers of the corporate
defendants." - Plaintiffs alleged quite generally that these individuals
74. Id. at 557 (quoting Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975))).
75. Id. at 558.
76. "Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally." FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
77. For criticism of this aspect of the Second Circuit formulation, see Marcus, supra note 11, at
469-71.
78. 768 F. Supp. 892 (D. Mass. 1991).
79. See id. at 896-99. Judge Keeton later produced another disquisition on heightened pleading
requirements. See Boston & Me. Corp. v. Town of Hampton, 987 F.2d 855, 862-70 (1st Cir. 1993).
80. Before his appointment to the bench, Judge Keeton was the Langdell Professor at Harvard Law
School and the author of many books and articles. Of perhaps greater interest to readers of this
journal, the judge is also the younger brother of another titan-Page Keeton, longtime dean of the
University of Texas School of Law.
81. Besides Rule 9(b), see infra text accompanying notes 87-91, the judge also invoked Rule 12(e)
and Rule 8(f). It is apparent, however, that he had no concern about the ability of defendants to frame
an answer, so that Rule 12(e) seems irrelevant. Although Rule 8(f) does say that pleadings should be
construed to do "substantial justice," that language is a carry-over from the Field Code designed to
avoid hypertechnical grounds for rejecting complaints, not to justify more exacting scrutiny of them.
See 5 WRIGHT & MILtER, supra note 44, § 1286, at 14; WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 68 (noting that
doing "substantial justice" means that a court will not require technical exactness in the pleading as
required by the old rules, but will construe it in the pleader's favor).
82. Cash Energy, 768 F. Supp. at 893.
83. Id. at 900.
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"actually participated in and exercised control over the affairs of one or
more" of the corporate defendants.' Finding that these individuals could
be held personally liable only if they personally participated in the release
of toxic materials, the judge directed that, as to them, plaintiffs must plead
a factual basis rather than mere conclusionsA
It may be that a straightforward application of Rule 8's directive that
the complaint show that the pleader is entitled to relief would warrant this
requirement. But Judge Keeton chose to approach the problem from the
perspective of a scholarly general review of pleading provisions, noting
that "by the fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1988, the rules of pleading had become less generous and forgiving than
they were in 1938. "1 In particular, he explained that Rule 9(b)'s plead-
ing requirements had been "extended to a number of analogous areas...
where the original concern about opportunities for abuse inherent in the
freedom to plead conclusions rather than facts applies with like force. "I
Thus, Rule 9(b) was extended from securities fraud to areas of securities
law not involving fraud, and from there made the "short leap" to claims
under RICO.8" He also found that "[i]n several areas that do not involve
fraud, or even analogies to fraud by any stretch of the imagination, courts
have nonetheless emerged higher standards of particularity in pleading."89
He concluded that "[a]lthough an analogy to fraud is strained, CERCLA
involves many of the circumstances that have led courts to invoke higher
standards of specificity in other contexts. "' But Rule 9(b) in no sense
seeks to isolate cases presenting risks of abuse of litigation,9' and these
"analogies" do not rely on features that are analogous. Nonetheless, Judge
Keeton announced that "[u]nless and until guidance to the contrary appears
in legislation or precedent, I will so rule."'
I. Leatherman and the Securities Reform Act
Both legislation and precedent have emerged since Judge Keeton
spoke, but they cut in opposite directions. In Leatherman v. Tarrant
84. Id. at 896.
85. Id. at 900.
86. Id. at 899-900.
87. Id. at 897.
88. Id. at 898.
89. Id. at 899. A prime possible example of such an area would be civil rights cases, which the
judge discussed at some length. See id. at 898.
90. Id. at 900.
91. Cf. Marcus, supra note 11, at 479-80 (describing the difficulty of identifying a "strike suit").
92. Cash Energy, 768 F. Supp. at 900. Other courts have declined to follow Judge Keeton's lead.
See B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 521 (2d Cir. 1996); Warwick Admin. Group v. Avon
Prods., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 116, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States v. Azrael, 774 F. Supp. 376, 379
n.6 (D. Md. 1991) (all refusing to apply heightened pleading requirements in CERCLA actions).
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County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, the Supreme Court
appeared to re-embrace Conley v. Gibson's lax view of pleadings. 93
Plaintiffs in Leatherman claimed that defendant's officers had violated the
Fourth Amendment by making unjustified forcible entries into plaintiffs'
homes. Because respondeat superior does not create municipal liability in
such cases,' plaintiffs alleged that the municipality failed to provide
proper training.' The Fifth Circuit dismissed the complaint under what
it called a "heightened pleading standard" for such cases.96 Unlike some
other circuits,' it refused to accept as sufficient an allegation that the
officers' conduct conformed to municipal policy.
In a very brief opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
courts could not embrace "heightened pleading" requirements for certain
types of cases. Noting that the rules do prescribe heightened pleading for
certain types of cases in Rule 9(b), it intoned that "[e]xpressio unius est
exclusio alterius."98 Chief Justice Rehnquist said that the proper route for
upgrading pleading requirements would be rule amendments:
Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against
municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added
specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must
be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not
by judicial interpretation. In the absence of such an amendment,
federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and
control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather
than later.99
Leatherman left considerable confusion in its wake. Judge Keeton was
uncertain whether it was the precedent he had been awaiting, and he
declared in 1994 that "[t]he federal law regarding particularity-of-complaint
requirements is currently quite unsettled.""°° Certainly Leatherman
altered the result in some cases, as lower courts recognized. 10' But the
93. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intell. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
94. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1978).
95. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165.
96. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intell. & Coord. Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1055 (5th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
97. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[A] claim
of municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss 'even if the claim
is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to
official policy, custom, or practice.'" (citing Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th
Cir. 1986))).
98. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
99. Id. at 168-69.
100. Feliciano v. Dubois, 846 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (D. Mass. 1994).
101. For example, in Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 687 (1998), the magistrate judge twice found the complaints to be inadequate before
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actual reach of the decision is at least debatable, and even those who favor
broad application of the case are uncertain about its scope.'02
In at least one area closely analogous to the situation in Leatherman,
the lower courts have continued to insist on heightened pleading. The
Court observed that it had "no occasion to consider whether our qualified
immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading in cases
involving individual governmental officials." 3 That immunity jurispru-
dence is sometimes opaque on such issues," 5 and the Court's avoidance
of this question seems curious in light of its intonation regarding the
negative pregnant of Rule 9(b).1"5 Nevertheless, seizing on the Court's
observation, numerous courts persist in demanding that complaints against
individual officials contain particularized allegations."5 Indeed, the D.C.
Circuit even persisted for a time in its remarkable requirement that in cases
involving state of mind of the official, the pleadings show "direct" rather
than "circumstantial" evidence of that intent,"° although it has since
Leatherman was decided, but deemed the third amended complaint adequate due to the Supreme Court's
intervening decision curtailing specificity requirements. Id. at 291. See also MCM Parmers, Inc. v.
Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., 62 F.3d 967, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing, after Leatherman, to
require particularized allegations regarding market definition in an antitrust case); Frey v. City of
Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that Leatherman rejected heightened pleading
standards in § 1983 cases); Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir.
1994) (noting that the nascent movement to expand pleading particularity requirements was scotched
by Leatherman). Cf. Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 417 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that
Leatherman makes it clear that federal courts may not impose heightened pleading requirements, so it
was error for the district judge to apply "heightened pleading requirements" based on state law).
102. See Carl W. Tobias, Elevated Pleading in EnvironmentalLitigation, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
357, 372 (1994) ("Whether Leatherman prohibits enhanced pleading in environmental litigation is not
obvious from the Court's opinion.").
103. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166-67.
104. For an examination of these difficulties, see generally Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in
Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597 (1989).
105. See supra text accompanying note 98 ("Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.").
106. For example, in Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994), the court agreed that under
Conley v. Gibson the complaint would suffice but refused to change its earlier ruling that it lacked suf-
ficient particulars in light of the decision in Leatherman. Id. at 455; accord Lanigan v. Village of E.
Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467,479 n.6 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Leatherman only held that there is no heightened
pleading standard in civil rights cases pursuant to § 1983 against municipalities." (emphasis in
original)); Edgington v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 52 F.3d 777, 779 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating
that because Leatherman did not decide the question, the existing heightened standard for complaints
seeking damages from municipal officials would continue to apply); Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333,
340 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Leatherman is a case concerned solely with the pleading requirement of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as they relate to actions against municipalities."); cf. Baker v. Putal,
75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that heightened pleading requirements would continue to
apply to claims against a police officer, but not to those against the police chief, which are tantamount
to actions against the city and therefore governed by Leatherman).
107. See Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (requiring, despite Leatherman,
specific direct evidence of [the defendants'] intent in order to defeat a motion to dismiss" (emphasis
in original)), vacated on other grounds, 515 U.S. 321 (1995).
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retreated from that view"'8 and there has been further instruction on the
proper handling of qualified immunity from the Supreme Court.1 9
Accordingly, it is hardly clear that Leatherman has actually scotched all
heightened pleading requirements.
More to the point, Leatherman's message about Rule 8 is murky.
Despite his sensitivity in other areas to the problems that prompted lower
courts to develop heightened pleading requirements," l' Chief Justice
Rehnquist parroted Justice Black's incomplete version of Rule 8(a)(2) from
Conley v. Gibson: "all the Rules require is a 'short and plain statement of
the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."11 Although that rule
requires that the complaint include allegations "showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,""' the Court's opinion only brushed up against that
topic. The Court did note that "[a]ccording to respondents, the degree of
factual specificity required of a complaint by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure varies according to the complexity of the underlying substantive
law,""' but it nowhere addressed this idea directly or related it to Rule
8's requirements. Since Leatherman, lower courts have continued to
require sufficient allegations in analogous cases." 4  In sum, Leatherman
108. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (retracting the
direct-circumstantial distinction regarding an official's state of mind), rev'd on other grounds, No. 96-
827, 1998 WL 213193 (U.S. May 4, 1998).
109. As this essay went to press, the Court held, in Crawford-El v. Britton, No. 96-827, 1998 WL
213193 (U.S. May 4, 1998), that the D.C. Circuit improperly announced a rule requiring plaintiffs
asserting constitutional claims based on improper official motive to prove their cases by clear and
convincing evidence. It explained that this requirement was not authorized by Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982), on which the lower court had relied. See Crawford-El, at *11.
In passing, the Court noted that the court of appeals had already "disavowed its prior direct-
evidence rule" for pleadings. Id. at *5 n.5. It also said that "various procedural mechanisms already
enable trial judges to weed out baseless claims," id. at *11, and explained that "the court may order
a reply to the defendant's or a third party's answer under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) or grant
the defendant's motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)." Id. at *14.
110. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), which denounced the "in terrorem" power of groundless claims, id. at
741, and was invoked by the Second Circuit to justify its demanding standards in securities fraud cases,
see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
111. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intell. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
113. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167.
114. In Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23 (1 st Cir. 1996), the plaintiff argued that
it was improper to require heightened pleading in his civil rights action. Id. at 34-35. Assuming that
Leatherman would apply, the court nevertheless found that the plaintiff had failed to allege essential
elements of his claim. Id. at 35. For a contrasting example, consider Atchinson v. District of
Columbia, 73 F.3d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1996), in which the plaintiff alleged he was shot by a police officer
due to a failure of the municipality to train the officer adequately, id. at 419, exactly the claim made
in Leatherman. The court concluded that the allegation of a municipal practice must rest on some
factual basis, but found sufficient the circumstances alleged. Id. at 422-24. Plaintiff alleged that he
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has been a nudge, not a hanmerstroke, against high pleadings
requirements.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,11 passed over
the President's veto, pushes in the opposite direction. Heartened by the
Second Circuit's demanding attitude toward pleading requirements," 6
Congress sought at least to impose the Second Circuit's rule nationwide
and perhaps to fortify it as well." 7 As adopted over the President's veto,
the Act requires that the complaint "state with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the requisite state of
mind" if scienter is an element of the claim, and directs the court to dis-
miss the complaint unless this standard is satisfied."' In addition, the
Act adopts more exacting pleading standards for alleging false or mislead-
ing statements by requiring that the complaint:
specify each statement alleged to be misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation
regarding the statement is based on information and belief, the
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief
is formed." 9
The pleadings provisions of the Act were the first thing that President
Clinton raised in his veto message. n °
Unquestionably, these statutory pleading requirements addressed
alleged abuses occurring in securities litigation.', Somewhat in keeping
with that purpose, the requirements stay all discovery pending resolution
of a motion to dismiss.' "  The extent to which the Act achieves this
objective is uncertain, however. At a minimum, the requirements clearly
replace the more relaxed attitude toward Rule 9(b) that prevailed in some
circuits.'1 The standard that Congress meant to adopt for alleging
was shot in broad daylight immediately after the officer ordered him to freeze. Id. at 419. Although
plaintiff would have to offer more to prevail at trial, this sufficed at the pleadings stage. Id. at 423.
115. Pub. L. 104-52, 109 Star. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. 11995)).
116. For a description of this, see supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
117. See Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road
Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 675 (1996). For a description of the Second Circuit's standard, see
supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
118. 15 U.S.C, § 78u-4(b)(2).
119. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1).
120. See WILLIAM J. CLINTON, VETO MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. DOC. No. 104-150, at 1 (1995).
121. See generally David C. Mahaffey, Pleading Standards andDiscovery Stays Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act: An End to Fishing Expeditions?, INSIGHTS, Feb. 1996, at 9.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(b)(1). It has been held that this moratorium applies to initial disclosure
under Rule 26(a)(1) as well as to formal discovery. See Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99
F.3d 325, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1996).
123. See, e.g., In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We conclude
that plaintiffs may aver scienter generally ... that is, simply by saying that scienter existed."). As
the court recognized in Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp.. 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D.
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scienter, however, remains unclear. The Second Circuit had specified what
it thought was necessary, 24 and the Senate version of the bill adopted
those standards."~ But the Conference Committee deleted them from the
Act for the stated purpose of further strengthening the statutory
standard. 26 As a consequence, the legislative history left a question
about how the courts should implement the new standard.r
Against that tangled background, it should hardly be surprising that
the impact of the Act's new pleading regime has been ambiguous. The
Securities and Exchange Commission undertook a comprehensive study of
the Act's first year of operation and found disagreement among courts on
whether the Second Circuit's requirements, or more stringent ones, should
be employed. But one thing is clear from the SEC study-a year after the
Act went into effect, no case had been dismissed without leave to amend
for failure to satisfy the new pleading requirements'--although dismis-
sals have occurred since then. 29  Accordingly, measured in terms of
effectiveness, 130 and given the fact that dismissals occurred in securities
fraud cases before the Act was adopted, this change has not had a cataclys-
mic impact on pleading practice. Moreover, as the Act's tightening of
pleading requirements takes effect, it may also increase the settlement value
of cases that survive motions to dismiss:
Though lax pleading requirements made the nuisance value of a suit
much more difficult to address through pretrial motions, it must also
be understood that the Reform Act's heightened pleading standard
Cal. 1996), the Act "leaves little doubt... that the lenient GlenFed standard can no longer be said to
constitute the sum of scienter pleading." Id. at 1309.
124. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993) (specifying two
ways of pleading scienter: alleging facts that establish a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to
do so, or alleging circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior).
125. See 141 Cong. Rec. 89170 (daily ed., June 27, 1995).
126. SEE H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) ("Because the Conference Committee
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's
case law interpreting this pleading standard.").
127. The ambiguity of Congress's standard has provoked commentary:
While Congress borrowed the "strong inference" standard from Second Circuit case law,
Congress did not say how this standard could be satisfied and it is not at all clear from
the language alone that Congress intended to import the Second Circuit's two-part test as
the means for satisfying this new standard.
MELVIN R. GOLDMAN, THE REFORM ACT-ONE YEAR LATER: THE NEXT GENERATION 11 (24th
Annual Securities Regulation Institute, Jan. 22-24, 1997); see also Weiss, supra note 117, at 681-83
(suggesting that application of the new law will parallel to a large extent the Second Circuit standard).
128. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. SEC. AND ExCH. COMM'N, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 2 (1997).
129. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(dismissing claims with prejudice, pursuant to the Act).
130. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (describing the frequency of dismissals on
motions to dismiss).
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credentials suits that survive pretrial motions so that [they] will have
greater settlement value than such suits had on average before the
Reform Act. .. . [C]ounsel should feel more confident in the case
after satisfying the new pleading requirements than the counsel who
previously had to know less and plead less to withstand a challenge
to the pleadings.'
IV. Pleading Practice at Century's End
Determining with empirical certainty whether a widespread change in
pleading practice has occurred would require efforts beyond the scope of
this essay, 32 but a review of recent published decisions suggests that no
dramatic shift has occurred. Before turning to this experience, however,
it is worthwhile to pause and reflect on why pleadings practice has endured
despite over a half century of reforms designed in large measure to sup-
press the activity.
As a starting point, pleading clearly does not now occupy a position
that approaches its centrality under the common law system. Some liti-
gants may have pursued formalistic pleading requirements for their own
value under prior systems, but in the current era they may be assumed to
act for more practical and immediate objectives. Pleading requirements
and motion practice generally favor defendants, who are more likely to
profit from specifics in complaints and more likely to look on pleading
motions as beneficial. 3  This feature does not make pleadings practice
per se bad, however. Indeed, the objection of defendants that they are
unable to wrest pretrial decisions of the merits from judges sufficiently
often"M reflects a legitimate desire that pleadings decisions may tend to
satisfy.
But it is simplistic to assume that only defendants would employ or
promote exactness in pleadings, or that plaintiffs would always disfavor
pleadings motions. The motion for judgment on the pleadings, for
instance, is essentially designed for plaintiffs-for the defendant, it raises
the same question as a motion to dismiss. 35  Even under the most
131. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 497, 520
(1997).
132. For the results of some empirical efforts, see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
133. See Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 815 (1981) (describing the innate advantages
for defendants of demanding pleading requirements).
134. See Janet CooperAlexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 527-57 (1991) (describing the unavailability of adjudication prior to
trial and the resulting incentives to avoid "bet the company" trials).
135. See Lynne C. Hermle, Summary Judgment Motions in Discrimination Cases: Bringing,
Defending and Appealing, in 2 26TH ANNUAL INSTITuTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 877, 948 (1997) ("A
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relaxed view of notice pleading, making the sort of precise allegations the
rules contemplate potentially serves plaintiffs' interests.136 Clark himself
did not favor bare-bones complaints 37 even though he deplored motions
directed to them, 3 ' and a plaintiff who includes rifle-shot allegations may
be rewarded with precise admissions and denials that advance the case. 139
The recent addition of Rule 26(a)(1) directing initial disclosure when
plaintiff pleads with particularity may sweeten the pot somewhat,1" but
it hardly provides the only stimulus toward precise and forthcoming
pleading. In addition, in the event defendant does not respond, a clear and
thorough complaint may pay dividends at the default stage. As Professor
Hazard observes in his contribution to this Symposium, "ordinarily
plaintiffs in American litigation actually plead with the kind of specificity
required elsewhere in the world. Doing so helps the judge understand what
the case is about, and it incidently helps the opposing side." 4'
Even motions to dismiss may not be anathema to plaintiffs to the
extent one might suppose. The rules themselves partly recognize that
plaintiffs might embrace them, for Rule 12(d) allows the plaintiff to insist
on a decision before trial regarding defenses that the defendant has chosen
to raise in the answer, rather than by motion to dismiss. With some issues,
a resolution early in the litigation may favor the plaintiff more than the
defendant. For example, an early adverse ruling regarding subject matter
jurisdiction would allow the plaintiff to refile elsewhere. Even if some
tolling principle guards against the bar of limitations should the defendant's
objection later be sustained, that delay in establishing the validity of the
defendant's objection to the suit does not benefit the plaintiff.
motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standards set forth in Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim.").
136. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (requiring all the allegations to be separate paragraphs, each setting
forth a single set of circumstances).
137. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 38, at 244 (2d ed.
1947).
138. See id. at 341-44 (arguing for the abolition of the motion for a bill of particulars and the
motion for a more definite statement).
139. Consider one observer's recommendations:
Establish facts through the pleadings. The complaint is often the plaintiff's first
discovery device. A carefully drafted complaint can streamline the discovery process by
eliminating unnecessary time and expense. In order to do this, numbered individual
paragraphs should generally contain only one central thought or factual allegation.
Eliminate all unnecessary adjectives and adverbs. It is always tempting to use the
complaint as a polemic, but it is almost always inappropriate and strategically wrong.
A nonargumentative and simple paragraph within a complaint may very well elicit
an admission in the answer, thereby conclusively establishing the facts alleged in that
particular paragraph.
Michael J. Fox, Planning and Conducting a Discovery Program, LITIGATION, Summer 1981, at 13,
14.
140. This assumes, of course, that the plaintiff wants disclosure to apply. If not, Rule 26(a)(1)
may deter plaintiffs from pleading with particularity.
141. Hazard, supra note 7, at 1672.
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Granting these points, it still seems odd that plaintiffs would ever
welcome or wish to accelerate the decision on whether they have stated a
claim. In many instances, they may hope that discovery will unearth
strong evidence of some perfidy that they only suspected when filing, or
that discovery may reveal some entirely different misconduct that can be
turned to advantage. Those prospects should incline them to resist any
effort toward prompt resolution. The assumption that these incentives
always exist explains the surprise of jurists like Judge Posner when con-
fronted by plaintiffs who provide details not required:
We have expressed our puzzlement that lawyers insist on risking
dismissal by filing prolix complaints. But nothing in the federal
rules forbids the filing of prolix complaints.... If plaintiff's
lawyers want to live dangerously-or want to find out sooner rather
than later whether they have a claim-they can. 42
The willingness to "live dangerously" may, however, demonstrate
counsel's rationality. At least some plaintiffs' attorneys will not wish to
fly blind into massive discovery without knowing whether the court would
sustain a claim on their version of events. Of course, if plaintiffs expect
the evidence to affect the judge's interpretation of the law, they would want
full discovery first. 43 But in a number of instances the prospective cost
of discovery might prompt counsel to prefer an early ruling on whether
their legal theory will satisfy the judge. Recent data indicating that
discovery often costs plaintiffs (or their lawyers) as much as it costs
defendants" 4 suggests a reason for counsel to want an early resolution of
that threshold question in a number of cases. Coupled with the possible
value in advancing their own cases through precise pleading, 5 this urge
could explain why plaintiffs in some cases set forth detail even if they are
not required to do so.
Plaintiffs and defendants are not the only ones whose attitudes affect
the vibrancy of pleading practice; if courts hewed rigidly to the line laid
down in Conley v. Gibson, pleading practice would probably have
vanished. One stimulus for courts is the rise in caseloads that might be
nibbled down by dismissing more cases.'4 Surely that behavior would
142. Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
143. See Friedenthal, supra note 133, at 818-19 (arguing that broad discovery has affected the
interpretation of the common law); cf. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L.
REv. 747 (1998) (questioning the frequency of a relationship between substantive law development and
broad discovery).
144. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice
Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998) (reporting that discovery costs
are roughly equal for plaintiffs and defendants across a broad band of federal litigation).
145. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
146. One appellate court acknowledged this impact:
The pressure of heavy caseloads in the district courts ... has placed strains on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.. . . Increasingly the rules are bent-Rule 56 to allow
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be hard to justify if it involved taking significant shortcuts on the proper
process for resolving cases. But even were judges inclined to take such
shortcuts, caseload pressures would offer an incomplete explanation for
promoting pleading practice. Most cases involve familiar issues inappro-
priate for disposition this way, so the courts are unlikely to make a sizable
dent in their civil caseload in this manner. More significantly, a principled
effort to manage the docket through pleadings motions would involve addi-
tional labor and uncertainty. Deciding a case on the merits takes consider-
able work. Subjecting most of the docket to active pleading-practice would
compound the work required to decide the significant number of cases that
would survive pleading scrutiny.
Pleading practice could even impede ultimate resolution of the case.
Most cases settle, but defendants encouraged to think that they could win
on a pleadings motion could refuse to consider settlement until they found
out if that would work. If clearing the docket is a court's goal, then, it
might better refuse to consider any pleadings motions and instead set a
short period for discovery and an early trial date. Indeed, this is essen-
tially the prescription for problems of cost and delay that emerges from the
recent RAND study of the operation of the Civil Justice Reform Act. 47
From the judge's perspective, as from the parties', pleading practice
makes sense when it resolves the case or advances it toward resolution. A
motion that only goes to the form of the complaint fails to accomplish
either objective, explaining the suggestion that more definite statements be
available to pave the way for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only when they offer
promise for a dismissal."4 In the broad range of cases, pleadings cannot
achieve this result.
Consider, for example, suits for negligence. In garden variety
situations, such as automobile accidents, requiring more than a conclusory
allegation that plaintiff may sue for her injuries because they were caused
by defendant's negligence would serve no purpose. Official Form 9
embodies this point in the most straightforward way. It says that a plaintiff
who is a pedestrian can state a claim against a defendant driver by alleging
that at a certain date and place defendant "negligently drove a motor
vehicle against plaintiff," causing plaintiff to be injured. 49 Requiring
that plaintiff provide more detail about what defendant did or didn't do
cases that formerly would have gone to trial to be disposed of on summary judgment,
Rules 8 and 12 to allow cases that formerly would have gotten at least as far as summary
judgment to be decided on the pleadings.
Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 153 (7th Cir. 1995).
147. See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 89 (1997) (finding that confining the period for discovery and
setting early trial dates will reduce the time required for disposition of a case without increasing costs).
148. See supra note 70.
149. FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 9.
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("failed to keep a proper lookout") or the precise manner in which this
delict led to plaintiff's injuries would offer no promise of deciding whether
plaintiff really has a claim against defendant.
But this conclusion need not obtain for all complaints for negligence;
some complaints may provide grounds to challenge the implicit allegations
of the Form as to duty and proximate cause. To take a classic example,
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,'" consider whether the same simplicity
would be appropriate: "Defendant negligently assisted another passenger
onto the train, thereby causing plaintiff to be hurled to the ground and
injured."' 5' Even though Palsgraf was also a claim for negligence, such
a delphic complaint cries out for inclusion of more details, not only to give
defendant notice but also to permit the court to scrutinize the legal suf-
ficiency of plaintiff's claim in terms of the necessary elements of foresee-
ability and proximate cause.
This tailoring of the pleading follows from the defendant's argument
in Leatherman-that the level of detail and type of allegations vary with the
type of case. 52 Even within legal categories, such as negligence, it may
vary. The elements for this tailored scrutiny of the pleadings must be
found in the substantive law, and they may sharpen over time so that plead-
ings dispositions are more workable. 153
At least in some recent reported decisions, this sort of tailored applica-
tion of the substantive law has been possible at the pleading stage. In a
breach of contract suit, for example, the Seventh Circuit upheld dismissal
because the contract contained a limitation of remedies clause that pre-
cluded suit for the remedies plaintiff sought."5 The court also upheld
rejection of plaintiff's proffered amendment alleging that the limitation on
remedies was unconscionable:
Pursuant to [plaintiff's] own allegations, the damage limitation
provision here was included in a contract that two experienced
commercial parties had negotiated over a period of ten months....
[B]ased on [plaintiff's] own allegations, it does not appear that the
bargaining positions of the parties are such that [defendant] could
have forced the damage limitation provision on an unsuspecting
adversary. 15
150. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
151. 1 am indebted to my colleague David Jung for this example.
152. See supra text accompanying note 113.
153. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 460-62 (explaining how the emergence of substantive law ele-
ments could be emphasized in pleadings motions).
154. See CogniTest Corp. v. Riverside Publ'g Co., 107 F.3d 493, 497-98 (7th Cir. 1997); see
also Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. O.R. Concepts, Inc., 69 F.3d 785,792 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming the
dismissal of a breach of contract action because the defendant did not violate the contract or its obliga-
tions under the illinois law of good faith and fair dealing).
155. CogniTest, 107 F.3d at 499.
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Similarly, the Eighth Circuit recently upheld dismissal of a securities
fraud suit brought by purchasers of newly-issued stock in a computer
firm." 6  Although this case was not governed by the new Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act,1 7 the district court reviewed the pro-
spectus that accompanied the stock offering and held that the alleged mis-
statements were immaterial as a matter of law. 151 The appellate court
agreed that the alleged overstatement of defendant's assets by $6.8 million
was immaterial because it was less than 2% of the company's total
assets. 59 In addition, under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine"6 that
alleged misrepresentations are immaterial as a matter of law if accompanied
by sufficient cautionary statements, it found the prospectus to command
dismissal:
A dismissal of a securities fraud complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
should be granted under the bespeaks caution doctrine only where
"the documents containing defendants' challenged statements include
enough cautionary language or risk disclosure that reasonable minds
could not disagree that the challenged statements were not
misleading."
Only by discarding common sense and ignoring the multitude
of explicit and on-point warnings contained in [the company's]
prospectus could investors have been misled by the
misrepresentations allegedly made by the Defendants in [the
company's] prospectus. Because a reasonable investor would not
have ignored such warnings, these alleged misrepresentations are
immaterial as a matter of law. 6'
In other situations, recent decisions find sufficient specifics to resolve
only some claims. For example, in another 1997 case, plaintiff sued a
156. See Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 548 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
"defendant's alleged misrepresentations or omissions [were] immaterial as a matter of law [because they
were] accompanied by sufficient cautionary statements").
157. See supra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
158. See Parnes, 122 F.3d at 545. The Court of Appeals noted that usually the fact that a defen-
dant had submitted the prospectus with its motion to dismiss would transform that motion into a sum-
mary judgment motion, but that reliance was nevertheless permissible because the plaintiff's complaint
was based on the prospectus. See id. at 546 n.9. Such a position conforms with the general willing-
ness of courts to consider material not attached to the complaint, see supra notes 61-67 and accompany-
ing text.
159. See Parnes, 122 F.3d at 547.
160. For a description of this doctrine, see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER
TRADING § 4.2.3.2, at 141 n.59 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures That "Bespeak Caution,"
49 Bus. LAW. 481, 482-83 (1994).
161. Parnes, 122 F.3d at 548-49 (quoting Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1136 (1996)) (emphasis in original).
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number of police officers and the municipality after a traffic stop for an
improper left turn. 62 The plaintiff's complaint was unusually specific
about what happened 63 and showed that the officer who stopped the
plaintiff could reasonably have believed that the plaintiff violated the traffic
code in making his turn. Accordingly, although plaintiff "did not have to
plead with specificity to meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)," he did, and
"those particulars show that he has no claim" against this officer.164 As
to a second officer, who administered one push and poke with his night
stick, the court concluded that there might be a constitutional violation,
depending on whether this use of force was "objectively reasonable" in
view of the totality of the circumstances. 65 Given the rising level of
confrontation portrayed in the complaint, the district court concluded that
this single poke was reasonable." 6 The appellate court disagreed:
[W]e do not believe we know enough about the level of confrontation
to make an informed judgment about the objective reasonableness of
[the officer's] use of force. Because of the limited notice pleading
standard in Rule 8(a) ... we cannot say that [the plaintiff] has failed
to allege a possible constitutional violation by [this officer]. 67
Finally, as to the police chief, who did not intervene to stop the jostling,
the court found the "fact-specific allegations in the complaint" sufficient to
show that the encounter was so brief that the chief could not be liable for
failure to intercede. 68
These cases show that merits dispositions are still possible under the
rules. They do not show whether courts may or should often press for
details to facilitate such dispositions. The need to proceed to summary
judgment even in cases that include considerable details suggests that this
avenue may often prove preferable. As I have argued elsewhere, 69 the
summary judgment route offers the promise of more satisfactory disposi-
tions based on evidence rather than mere allegations. The Supreme Court's
162. See Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1997).
163. See id. (describing the minute detail regarding the incident included in the complaint).
164. Id. at 474. For another example, see Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1994), in
which a prisoner alleged that the defendants' denial of his release request to attend his mother's funeral
was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 558. But he also explained in his complaint that the problem
involved a secretary forgetting to forward the order of release. Id. The court explained that the
prisoner was not "saved by having pleaded a legal conclusion that if consistent with the facts would
establish his right to relief, for he has shown that it is inconsistent with the facts." Id. at 559.
165. Lanigan, 110 F.3d at 475.
166. See id. at 470 & n.3.
167. Id. at 475.
168. Id. at 478.
169. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 484-91.
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endorsement of more vigorous use of summary judgment in 1986170
"revitaliz[ed] the summary judgment device."' 7' Even though defendants
have long shunned this alternative because it subjects them to discovery and
imposes a more onerous burden in making the motion itself, these concerns
have abated. It may not be true that "[s]omething close to a one page form
motion by defendant can throw on the plaintiff the responsibility to dredge,
structure, collate and cross-reference all materials in the file to make them
available to the judge before trial," " but the willingness of courts to
curtail discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) after the making of such a motion
takes a good deal of the sting out of proceeding to that stage. 73
Notwithstanding these inducements to rely on summary judgment,
recent decisions also show that courts sometimes construct dubious new
pleading barriers. In keeping with former efforts to borrow Rule 9(b)'s
particularity requirements for areas considered "analogous" to fraud, 74
courts apparently still strain to justify the application of those requirements
outside their natural sphere. 75 Beyond that, other inventive pleading
requirements sometimes emerge. Most notably, in a 1995 case the Fifth
Circuit hit upon the reply authorized in Rule 7-which the court recognized
as "a vestige of pre-1938 common law and code pleading"' 76-as a
method of requiring a plaintiff to respond to the qualified immunity defense
raised in the answer in a suit against municipal officers. Judge
Higginbotham emphasized "the reality that what is short and plain is
inseparable from the legal and factual complexity of the case at issue" and
that the court's prior "insistence on pleading with particularity translated
to no more than an insistence that the complaint not plead
conclusions."'" Faced with Leatherman, however, he found it necessary
170. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
171. EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 (1994).
172. D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the
Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 35, 41 (1988).
173. Rule 56(f) permits the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to submit an affidavit
supporting a request that the trial court postpone its decision until discovery or investigation can be
completed. In the Second Circuit's view, leave to undertake discovery is anything but automatic: "The
affidavit must include the nature of the uncompleted discovery; how the facts sought are reasonably
expected to create a genuine issue of material fact; what efforts the affiant has made to obtain those
facts; and why those efforts were unsuccessful." Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132,
1138 (2d Cir. 1994).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
175. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Lab., 156 F.R.D. 219, 221 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (applying
Rule 9(b) to the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct in obtaining the patent in suit due to "public
policy considerations" such as the cost of litigating such claims, the ease with which allegations of
inequitable conduct can be made, and the temptation to use them as a delaying tactic or to justify a fish-
ing expedition).
176. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1432 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
177. Id. at 1430.
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to retrieve the reply as a vehicle for the same thing. Whether or not the
case at hand needed the reply procedure, 178 it does seem something of a
stretch. 17
9
V. Time to Amend the Federal Pleading Rules?
In Leatherman, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the pleading
rules might properly be amended.'80 The recent acrobatics used by some
courts to find alternative methods of doing what they did before that
decision"'1 might indicate that the time has come to do so. Other recent
examples of the successful use of pleadings motions could fortify that
conclusion." Considering what those amendments might be, however,
provides reason for caution.
Pursuing Charles Clark's original vision could lead to abolishing
pleading motions altogether. The Advisory Committee once toyed with
partial abolition by eliminating the Rule 12(b)(6) motion," and it might
make a clean sweep of pleading practice by eliminating the motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the motion for a more definite statement, and
the motion to strike on the grounds that pleading motions serve little
purpose unless they are dispositive.' Merits dispositions would then
require a motion for summary judgment.
The complete demise of pleadings motions might work only a modest
change. One fly in the ointment is that in securities fraud cases it would
seem entirely ineffective because the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act appears, by its own force, to command that the motion to dismiss con-
tinue to operate in cases in which it applies."8 Although a rule abolish-
ing pleadings motions might supersede that provision, that would be a cur-
ious way to nullify such a recent statute. Putting aside that difficulty, a
motion for summary judgment might readily address, to an equivalent
178. Judge Jones concurred specially on the ground that in cases involving qualified immunity,
the heightened pleading requirement continued to apply. See id. at 1434-36. Judge Higginbotham also
suggested that the Fifth Circuit's prior pleading requirement was not the same as Rule 9(b). See id.
at 1431.
179. The court appeared to say that district judges have little discretion to decline a defendant's
request that the plaintiff be required to file a reply. See id. at 1434 ("[A] district court's discretion not
to do so is narrow indeed when greater detail might assist."). Thus, the court contemplates that replies
be routinely required. But as Professor Wright notes, "occasions when this power should be or has
been exercised are extremely rare." WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 66 at 457. For a case in which the court
upheld the adequacy of a reply, see Warnock v. Pecos County, 116 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 1997).
180. See supra text accompanying note 99.
181. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 52-72 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying note 118.
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degree, many cases suitably resolved on the pleadings. 86 But despite
recent relaxations in summary judgment practice, the moving party still
must make an initial showing that the motion is justified."S Because the
moving party must comply with Rule 11, some discovery could often be
required, thereby hamstringing access to merits dispositions.' Hence,
even if summary judgment provided an alternative, eliminating pleadings
motions would work a meaningful change.
More significantly, the abolition of formal motions to challenge the
sufficiency of plaintiff's claims would not eliminate the interest of judges
in testing doubtful claims. To a significant extent, that desire explains the
persistence of pleading practice,'89 and it will not disappear in an age of
increasing judicial management of litigation. Judges will be inclined to
engage more vigorously in informal policing through status conferences,
an undertaking somewhat underwritten in the rules."9 Active case man-
agers have been doing so for some time.' 9' Other judges who are not so
inclined can presently rely on motion practice to provide the parties a
method for raising these issues. Denied that avenue, they might feel
obliged to ensure that some meaningful screening of claims occurs. Judge
Keeton's reaction to Leatherman is instructive in this regard-confronted
with doubts about whether heightened pleading requirements could provide
a vehicle for screening claims he viewed as dubious, he simply shifted
gears to case management and ordered the parties to file a "written
submission... stating with particularity at least an outline or summary of
the facts and the legal grounds of each claim.""
One reaction to this impulse is that it represents an improper attempt
to backtrack on notice pleading. 93 Yet judges inclined in this direction
are not clinging to formalities, and Rule 16 provides alternative support to
justify what they are doing."9 Moreover, it resembles the free-form oral
activities that antedated reliance on written pleadings, an exercise reflected
186. See, e.g., supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
187. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
188. This problem might not exist if the plaintiff's initial disclosure, pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1),
suffices to provide the basis for the motion.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
190. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1) (authorizing the court to take action at a pretrial conference
regarding "simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses").
191. See Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Case From Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770, 780 (1981) ("The informal outline of the issues
at the outset of the status conference also helps the parties focus on possible grounds for dismissal or
summary judgment.").
192. Feliciano v. Dubois, 846 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Mass. 1994).
193 See Peckham, supra note 191, at 787 ("Many attorneys feel that such [pretrial] orders are,
in effect, analogous to the much-maligned code and common-law pleadings systems that once prevailed
in this country. .. ").
194. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1).
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in some modem judicial systems."9 But proceeding in the informal man-
ner of case management has drawbacks. At least a formal motion process
involves the structure of moving papers, responding papers, and a subse-
quent hearing. The case management model need not unduly curtail that
sort of careful inquiry, but it potentially creates a risk of improvident
rulings. 11 Because there are virtues as well as vices to pleading
practice,"9 requiring a shift to this mode of operation seems dubious.
The Leatherman decision itself may have blunted whatever force might
have existed for further limiting pleading practice in this manner. 9 '
Although courts still entertain pleadings motions, they seem somewhat
chastened by that decision in the very areas in which pleading practice is
most dubious. Because heightened pleading requirements are most ques-
tionable when used to probe factual conclusions, ' that is a positive
development. Only a radical rule amendment would produce greater
departure from undue insistence on pleading niceties.
Turning the foregoing on its head, Leathennan might provide a reason
to expand the coverage of Rule 9(b) to include other types of claims. But
this tightening of pleading requirements for certain types of cases would
create considerable problems of substance-specific rulemaking.2  Of
course, Congress may legislate this way, as it has with the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act. The rules process, however, is not
supposed to craft special rules according to the substantive category of the
case. One could criticize Rule 9(b) on this ground, but that is water under
the bridge, and the rule itself was based on an assumption that judges
would so require anyway."' It would therefore be more consistent with
rulemaking to fortify the pleading requirements for all claims. But trying
to spell out what must be shown for all types of cases constitutes a hercu-
lean task-one that could never keep up with the legal developments it was
attempting to capture. As an alternative, one might fortify Rule 8 with a
reminder that, even though the Supreme Court seems not to have
noticed,' it already requires that the complaint show that the pleader is
195. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
196. Cf. Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or
Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 394,420 (1986) (reporting numerous incidents in which
the author, a magistrate judge, reversed his tentative decision, consequently becoming "more sensitive
to the dangers inherent in speedy and wholly oral proceedings").
197. See supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
199. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 466-71.
200. Cf. Marcus, supra note 11, at 471-80 (discussing heightened pleading for "suspicious"
claims); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 761, 776-79 (1993) (examining the transsubstantive nature of the rules).
201. See Clark, supra note 23, at 463-64 (characterizing Rule 9 as useful, but not essential,
because it "probably states only what courts would do anyhow").
202. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
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entitled to relief. But recognizing that the rule already says what needs to
be said also highlights the problems attending amendments that go beyond
announcing "We really mean it." That hardly seems productive.
What remains, then, involves a kind of common-law activity in which
judges develop standards for assessing the complaints in different kinds of
cases. Much as this process might be attacked as inconsistent with the
transsubstantive orientation of the rules, it actually comports with the
relatively loose wording of the rules. Even the official forms, spare though
they are, vary in detail depending on the type of claim asserted.=
Perhaps it would be profitable to promote some additional attention to the
adequacy of pleadings by upgrading Rule 12(e) to say that the motion for
a more definite statement can properly serve the function the commentators
view as appropriate,' but that endorsement will not provide a guide to
determining when requiring further specifics is warranted. As with the
decision whether the case can be reliably resolved on the pleadings, that
determination necessarily turns on some assessment of the individual case.
That this may give the judge latitude for discretion is not a reason for
lamenting, as current practice of judicial management shows, but it is a
reason to be very cautious about rule amendments to foster this activity.
VI. Conclusion
For much of this century, the prevailing view has been that change in
procedure tends always toward the more relaxed and away from the more
rigid.' That certainly describes the Federal Rules' treatment of
pleadings. But one may doubt the universal attractiveness of unbridled
flexibility.' °  More to the point, what goes up can come down, and
change may move toward constraint rather than latitude. In many ways,
the last quarter century has produced changes in the rules that sought to
constrain rather than to liberate.2'
The pleading rules have not changed, and Conley v. Gibson would
seem to have liberated litigants from pleading practice for all time. But
that did not happen, and the recent assist in Leatherman does not seem to
203. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. app. Form 6 (illustrating a complaint for money lent in two para-
graphs with a single paragraph demand), with id. app. Form 17 (illustrating a complaint for copyright
infringement and unfair competition in ten paragraphs with a five paragraph demand).
204. See supra note 70.
205. See MILLAR, supra note 22, at 5-6 (positing a "law of procedural progress" pursuant to
which "primitive" rigidities are discarded by more advanced systems).
206. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 1001-02 (1987) (describing how adop-
tion of the equity model, with great latitude in the rules, caused difficulties due to formlessness in
litigation).
207. See generally Marcus, supra note 143 (describing the orientation of recent amendments to
the discovery rules).
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have completed the task. To the contrary, pleading practice seems likely
to continue in one guise or another for a variety of reasons. The temper
of the practice probably owes as much to the temper of the times as to the
specific provisions of the rules. Those provisions might be changed, but
anything short of radical change would probably produce only moderate
change. So pleading practice is likely to persist in the future, as it did in
the past.
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